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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, your Excellencies, zeer 
gewaardeerde toehoorders,
The first lecture is both an opportunity to introduce oneself 
to one’s fellow scholars and to define a research agenda for 
my professorship on Bureaucracy and Democracy at Leiden 
University.  I am a social scientist with wide ranging interests 
who believes that several different perspectives are valuable 
in addressing broad questions of governance in modern 
society.  This leads me to avoid specialization in a single 
policy area or country and engage in what often might appear 
to be unconnected scholarship with the eventual objective 
of arriving at a more generalizable and coherent scholarly 
statement.  I am also a design scientist who believes that my 
fellow social scientists should be concerned not just with how 
things are, but how they might be.  This view has been much 
influenced by my time at the University of Wisconsin and “the 
Wisconsin ideal,” the idea that the university has no walls and 
should focus its efforts on real world problems. 
One of the major questions, perhaps the major question, in the 
field of public administration is how to reconcile the need for 
bureaucracy with the democratic process.  Bureaucracies after 
all are not seen as democratic institutions and operate based on 
hierarchy and expertise rather than popular will (see Mosher 
1968).  I take a distinctly minority view in the field, seeing 
bureaucracy not so much as a threat to democracy in existing 
mature democracies but as a necessary precondition for the 
existence of democracy in modern society (Meier 1997).  
Democracy is a system of governance with high transactions 
costs that seeks democratic ideals of representation, equity, 
and fairness with only modest, if any, concern for efficiency. 
Effective bureaucracies are the institutions that produce the 
outcomes that build public support for democracy and in a 
sense generate the surplus that allows democratic processes 
to survive and flourish.  Although bureaucracies may have 
none of the trappings of democracy internally, their role 
in contributing to democratic governance means that they 
should also be considered democratic institutions. Scholars, 
politicians, and citizens need to be concerned about preserving 
and protecting bureaucracy just as they seek to preserve and 
protect our official institutions of democracy.
Within the general theme of bureaucracy and democracy, 
this lecture will address two major concerns – (1) the 
failure of politics which severs the crucial link between 
voters and elected officials and poses major challenges to 
bureaucrats seeking to administer effective programs, and 
(2) the subsequent need for bureaucracy to also become an 
institution that represents the public.  Within this concern 
about bureaucratic representation, the lecture will address 
how bureaucracies can assess the needs of citizens, and 
more narrowly how representative bureaucracy can be and 
is instrumental to the bureaucracy, and finally the limits of 
symbolic representation within bureaucracies. 
The Failure of Politics 
The predominant approach to bureaucracy and democracy 
is the idea of overhead democracy.  The electoral process is 
assumed to create a linkage between the public and elected 
officials such that elected officials will seek the policy goals 
of the general public.  Elected representatives in turn then 
impose these values on the bureaucracy creating a principal-
agent chain that runs from the public through elected 
officials to government bureaucrats.  Within this framework, 
most discussions of bureaucracy and democracy start with 
a discussion of the claimed problems of bureaucracy such 
as inefficiency, citizen abuse, lack of effectiveness or other 
maladies (Goodsell 2014).  The arguments then proceed to 
remedies for bureaucratic reform often with catchy phrases like 
“reinventing government” that seek to reform the bureaucracy 
and, in the process, contribute to better governance within 
a democratic system.  Political scientists often present such 
arguments in terms of principal-agent models where solutions 
are presented in terms of how the principals (the politicians) 
can control the behavior of the agents (the bureaucrats) for 
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the benefits of everyone.  Problems in any principal-agent 
relationship, however, can have their origins in either the 
actions of the agent or the actions of the principal so that 
considering the full relationship between politics or democracy 
and bureaucracy is merited. Too often scholars focus solely on 
bureaucratic agents and ignore the political principals.
The starting point for any discussion of democracy and 
bureaucracy or of politics and administration should be 
the classic work by Frank Goodnow (1900), Politics and 
Administration, a book that is widely cited but rarely read. 
Goodnow is frequently misinterpreted to advocate a separation 
of politics from administration, but in fact he argues not for a 
separation, but a symbiosis. The functions are not separable, 
and rather both need to be performed for effective governance. 
As Goodnow (1900, p. 16) himself states about politics and 
administration:
“That is, while the two primary functions of government 
are susceptible of differentiation, the organs of government 
to which the discharge of these functions is intrusted [sic] 
cannot be clearly defined. It is impossible to assign each of 
these functions to separate authority.”
The political function is to resolve conflict, to take the 
cacophony of interests and voices and generate a policy. The 
administrative or bureaucratic function is to create policy via 
the implementation process. There are times when political 
branches engage in administration, and there are times when 
bureaucracies generate policy. The functions often intertwine 
within an institution. It is important, however, that both 
functions be performed for effective policy, otherwise, as 
concluded by Goodnow (1990, p. 23), “Lack of harmony 
between the law and its execution results in political paralysis. 
A rule of conduct, i.e. an expression of the state, will practically 
amount to nothing if it is not executed.”
In the symbiotic relationship between politics and bureaucracy, 
the advantages of the bureaucracy are maximized under 
specific conditions.  Bureaucracies are an optimal policy 
instrument for a variety of problems, and they can perform 
well or perhaps even best when (1) given clear goals, (2) there 
is political support for these goals, (3) adequate resources 
are provided, and (4) the bureaucracy is given autonomy to 
devise solutions based on expertise (Meier 1997; Meier et al. 
2018).  These givens are, of course, what the political system 
and the political function is designed to provide. Effective 
bureaucracies (and effective governance), therefore, require an 
effective political process. 
Examples of the failure of the political process to generate 
conditions where bureaucracy can be effective can be found 
around the world (see Meier, et al. 2018), but let me illustrate 
from the case I know best, the United States.  Rather than 
resolving conflict, the US political system lurches from 
crisis to crisis and exacerbates conflict as candidates and 
political parties quest for political advantage in the next 
cycle of elections.  We see periodic shutdowns of the federal 
government, the failure to adopt a federal budget coincident 
with its own fiscal year, tax policies that rely on faith rather 
than rational analysis, and at least 70 reputed attempts by 
Congress to repeal the Affordable Care Act (Riotta, 2017). 
Nor does the US political system generate clear goals for 
government policies. Extensive work by Hal Rainey and 
colleagues (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Rainey, 1993) indicates 
that government agencies are frequently tasked with unclear, 
ambiguous and at times conflicting goals (e.g., the US Postal 
Service needs to provide universal service and at the same 
time not run deficits, but cannot set prices). On the question of 
adequate resources, the chronic budget crises and emergency 
appropriations have left many programs underfunded forcing 
clients to engage in queuing processes that often undercut 
effective services (e.g., the VA hospitals in 2014). Lastly, 
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several cases suggest that bureaucratic agencies are not granted 
sufficient autonomy to best use their expertise. The military 
services are frequently required to accept weapons systems 
that they would prefer not to have (Cox, 2015), and federal 
family planning programs are saddled with a requirement 
for abstinence-only approaches to sex education despite the 
negative consequences of such policies (Kohler et al., 2008; 
Lindberg & Maddow-Zimet, 2012).  
The failure of political institutions to fulfill the key political 
roles of setting goals, providing political support, allocating 
resources, and granting autonomy has three implications for 
bureaucracies.  First, bureaucracies and bureaucratic managers 
need to both fill the traditional implementation role and also 
undertake the political role normally perceived to be the realm 
of politicians.  The US evidence indicates that historically 
that is possible.  Given the fragmentation of political power 
both in terms of separation of powers and federalism in the 
US (Long 1949), many bureaucracies were forced into highly 
political roles that might appear out of place in other countries. 
Government bureaucracies have built strong political support 
among interest groups and members of Congress (e.g., the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the National Institutes of Health, 
see McConnell 1970; Freeman 1955); they have used expertise 
to engender autonomy (e.g., agriculture research, the early 
Postal Service, see Carpenter 2001; they have developed 
political skills to influence the budget process to gain resources 
(Wildavsky 1964); and they have been able to clarify goals 
via policy implementation. That performing both roles is 
possible, however, does not mean it is easily done; the job of 
the bureaucratic manager becomes significantly more difficult.  
The skills needed in top and middle bureaucratic positions 
now must be varied and wide ranging.  The addition of this 
degree of difficulty means that the probability of policy failure 
increases, simply because bureaucrats must circumvent both 
administrative problems and political problems. 
Second, the failure of politics means policy success or failure 
rests on the actions of the bureaucracy not on those of the 
political institutions.  The capacity of the bureaucracy becomes 
far more important to policy success than the actions of 
the legislature.  Third, not all bureaucratic activities in such 
situations are functional since bureaucracies must move to 
protect capacity and in doing so can further distort public 
policy and perhaps undercut the democratic process. This will 
at times lead to bureaucracies challenging the political process 
(O’Leary, 2013; Rourke 1969) or engaging in activities that 
benefit the bureaucracy but not the broader public.
The failure of politics not only disrupts the relationship 
between elected officials and government bureaucrats, but 
it also severs the linkage between the electorate and their 
representatives as politicians seek short term electoral gains 
at the expense of longer term policy objectives.  If voters are 
not presented with policy choices by political candidates, 
then the public cannot inform politicians of their preferences, 
and the principal-agent link between voters and elected 
officials collapses.  The failure of politics, thus, breaks down 
both linkages in overhead democracy, that between citizens 
and elected officials and that between elected officials and 
bureaucrats. 
Bottom Up Democracy
Overhead democracy is not the only way to reconcile 
bureaucracy with democratic governance; bureaucracies can 
also act as democratic institutions and take citizen preferences 
into account when making decisions.  Even if one does not 
go so far as to claim a constituent function for bureaucracy, 
that is, as Cook (1992) argues the purpose of bureaucracy is 
to create democratic citizens; it is clear that bureaucracy can 
aggregate and respond to the interests of citizens as part of 
service delivery directly.  In the US, the highly decentralized 
governance system has forced bureaucracy into this role 
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(Long 1949). There is now an extensive literature on citizen 
engagement and methods of improving citizen engagement 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2001; Reddel and Woolcock 2004; Roberts 
2004).  My concerns focus on two more specific issues, how 
the bureaucracy can improve the ability of citizens to evaluate 
government and government services and the contributions 
bureaucracy can make through what is termed “representative 
bureaucracy.”
Effective democracy requires informed citizens and that should 
include the ability to assess the quality of public services.  
After all, the contested elections in mature democracies focus 
on policy issues about what services the government should 
provide for the public and how to finance them.  The growth 
in governments seeking stakeholder evaluations of services 
stands in contrast to an existing literature on difficulties of 
evaluating such services given the basic perceptual biases that 
psychologists have found that most individuals have (Tversky 
and Khaneman 1981). Similar biases in public perceptions 
have been found in the growing literature on behavioral public 
administration (Belle, Cantarelli and Belardinelli 2018; James 
et al. 2016; Marvel 2015; Olsen 2017).
Notwithstanding the complex nature of government services 
and the basic psychology of perception and judgment, new 
evidence on users’ ability to judge the quality of public services 
is being published.  A study of New York city indicates that 
citizens adjusted their evaluations of public schools based 
on test scores, outside evaluations, the level of school safety 
and other factors with some indications that they see value in 
schools beyond performance on standardized tests (Favero 
and Meier 2013). A study of Seoul, Korea, schools found that 
parents responded more to the schools’ overall performance 
than the performance of their own children suggesting 
the ability to make evaluations in a broader context (Song 
and Meier 2018).  A cross-national study of education in 
18 countries finds that policy design is important; parents 
can better judge the quality of schools when standards for 
performance are set nationally but local schools are given 
discretion in terms of managing human resources (Song, An, 
and Meier 2018).  In the evaluation of US hospitals, patients 
face major barriers of information asymmetry complicated 
by outcome bias that should prevent patients from accurately 
evaluating services, yet patient assessments are positively 
correlated with established medical performance standards 
(Cheon et al. 2019). 
Much work remains to be done in the area of citizen 
evaluation of government programs.  We need to understand 
what government agencies can do to facilitate the ability of 
citizens to make accurate evaluations.  This includes how 
to frame communication so that the purpose is to inform 
not to advocate, how much detail to provide, what types of 
comparisons to make (given that performance is inherently 
a comparative exercise), how the source of performance 
information can be made more reliable, and many other issues. 
Additional issues are present in simply the measurement 
of performance in terms of the interests of the public.  All 
agency outcomes are multidimensional and finding out how to 
measure the dimensions that the public cares about but are not 
presently part of official indicators is important. The Danish 
effort to assess both student well being and teacher well being 
in addition to standard performance indicators is a positive 
innovation.   
Representative Bureaucracy
Representative bureaucracy is a flourishing literature that 
argues a bureaucracy that looks like the citizens it serves is 
more likely to produce outputs that benefit those citizens.  
Some scholars even advocate representative bureaucracy as a 
major method for reconciling bureaucracy with democracy 
(Riccucci and Van Ryzin 2017). The correspondence between 
the composition of the bureaucracy and the benefits it 
produces via representation can occur in two general ways.  
First, the bureaucrats can actively represent the interests of 
those who look like them and, thus, seek to provide some 
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direct benefit to the citizen.  Second, the citizen might change 
his or her behavior simply because the bureaucrat looks like 
them and be more willing to change that behavior in a positive 
way whether that is greater cooperation or providing more 
effort.  Students might adopt a teacher who looks like them 
as a role model and work harder in school (Dee 2004) or a 
sexual assault victim might be more willing to report the 
crime if she notices more female police officers (Meier and 
Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  Because the second process does not 
require the bureaucrat to do anything different, it is referred 
to as symbolic representation.  Two issues in representative 
bureaucracy that I would like to address here are whether 
representative bureaucracy generates bias and limits to 
symbolic representation.  
Representation as Instrumental
Some critics of representative bureaucracy rely on Weber’s 
(1946) ideal-typical view of bureaucracy as a neutral 
instrument and criticize representative bureaucracy for 
inducing bias into a process that seeks to treat all individuals 
equally (Lim 2006).  Organizations establish rules and 
procedures to limit the discretion of bureaucrats so that 
decisions reflect the objectives of the organization. These 
actions are then reinforced though organizational socialization. 
The tension between bureaucratic representation and 
organizational socialization is the driving force behind 
much of the theoretical and empirical work in representative 
bureaucracy (Meier and Nigro 1976; Romzek and Hendricks 
1982). Organizational socialization is designed to persuade 
employees to subordinate their own values to those of 
the organization and thus to increase the productivity of 
the organization (Barnard 1938).  The tension between 
socialization and representation occurs because representation 
is perceived as something that might encourage a bureaucrat 
to make a decisions that would not otherwise be made and 
that would affect the organization’s effectiveness (Lim 2006).  
Although this logic has motivated substantial research 
examining the assumption of conflict between socialization 
and representation (Carroll 2017; Dolan 2002a; Romzek and 
Hendricks 1982), it is useful to reexamine the relationship 
theoretically because there are reasons to believe that the two 
do not always lead to cross pressures.  In essence the question 
is whether or not representation can be instrumental in the 
eyes of the organization – might it lead to a more effective 
agency and under what conditions might that be possible. 
The socialization concerns (and the bias concerns see Lim 
2006) focus on active representation at the individual level 
that results in decisions that would not normally be generated 
by the bureaucracy, but several cases of active representation 
can be viewed as instrumental in terms of agency goals.  First, 
there might cases where the minority bureaucrats actively 
represent by engaging in policy discussions with others in the 
organization and in the process persuade the organization 
to change policies.  As an example, minority teachers might 
convince a school that in-school suspensions are superior to 
out-of-school suspensions and expulsions (see Roch, Pitts 
and Navarro 2010), and such ameliorative forms of discipline 
appear to have fewer negative consequences than punishment-
oriented discipline.  The result will be changes in disciplinary 
practices that benefit minority students and nonminority 
students with the end result being better school performance.  
Active representation that generates policy changes would 
need to be evaluated for whether or not the policy changes are 
instrumental; they cannot on their face be considered negative 
for the organization unless organization objectives have to be 
considered static rather than something that evolves as the 
organization changes.
Second, the minority identity being represented might match 
up well with the mission of the agency.  The US military has 
long over represented individuals from Southern states where 
the military is held in high regard and seen as a potential 
career (Kane 2006).  A similar tradition involves the elite Welsh 
Guard units in the United Kingdom which appear to cultivate 
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traditional Welsh identities from a historic tradition (Harden 
2011).  More directly, representation of lived experiences is 
often used when drug treatment programs rely on former 
drug addicts as counselors or when former convicts are used 
to operate halfway houses for prisoners who are transitioning 
back into society (Hecksher 2007).  Such lived experiences give 
the bureaucrat insight into client problems and at the same 
time provide a role model for the client.  
Third, this second element of active representation implies a 
range of other instrumental representations that would occur 
if the minority bureaucrat brings skills to the organization that 
improve the functioning of the organization.  For example, 
a US police officer who speaks Spanish (or another language 
spoken in the community) has a greater chance of effective 
communication with residents and, thus, is more likely to 
gain information that solves crimes.  Calderon (2018), in a 
study of immigration enforcement in the US, demonstrated 
that policies designed to increase language diversity in 
law enforcement were associated with fewer overall law 
enforcement stops and arrests but more arrests of individuals 
with serious criminal records.  In short, these immigration 
officers were better able to meet the goals of the organization 
by focusing in important cases and avoiding the trivial ones.  
The minority bureaucrat might not bring skills per se but a 
better understanding of the needs of the clientele.  The use of 
former drug addicts in treatment programs operates under 
this premise (Hecksher 2007).  This understanding is especially 
important in minority and immigrant communities where 
cultural norms differ from those of the rest of population. 
Fourth, minority bureaucrats might also bring more valuable 
skills to the organization as the result of segmented labor 
markets.  Research on education has long demonstrated that 
women teachers in elementary and secondary education have 
higher levels of skills than male teachers as the result of long 
historical stereotyping of teaching as a female profession (for 
cross national results on this question see An, Song, and Meier 
2017).  A similar pattern appears in Texas where talented 
first generation Latinos opt for teaching careers over other 
professions because they see teaching as a profession that is 
open to them (Meier and O’Toole 2006).  A classical example 
of this in the private sector is the extensive over representation 
among high steel construction workers among the Mohawk 
(see Blanchard 1983). The special skills argument is a 
general case of an argument found in two somewhat distinct 
literatures.  The diversity management literature contends 
that more diverse workforces bring a wider range of ideas and 
information to the organization with the result that this should 
generate better quality decisions (Ashikali and Groeneveld 
2015; Groeneveld and Verbeek 2012).  The representative 
bureaucracy and distributional equity literature (Meier, 
Wrinkle and Polinard 1999) posits that nonrepresentative 
bureaucracies are likely to discriminate in the labor market and 
thus have lower quality employees.    
Fifth, given that many public programs are implemented 
through networks of public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations in non hierarchical delivery systems (O’Toole 
1997), minority bureaucrats might bring their own unique 
networks to the organization, networks that majority 
bureaucrats cannot access.  For example, the outreach of 
government programs in the African American community 
can be greatly aided by the multifunctional nature of African 
American churches, and one would expect that many African 
American bureaucrats would have pre-existing ties to such 
organizations (McDaniel 2009).  The same argument can 
be applied to the various minority social service fraternities 
and sororities. These ties might be useful to the agency both 
in terms of program implementation and also in terms of 
building political support in the community. 
In addition to these active representation aspects that 
are instrumental for the organization, there are also two 
cases where symbolic representation is likely to benefit the 
organization.  First, there are several documented cases 
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in the literature where symbolic representation appears to 
change the behavior of clients in such a way that it benefits 
the organization: greater parental involvement in schools 
(Vinopal 2017), willingness of women to report sexual assaults 
(Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006), and a great trust of police 
officers among African Americans (Riccucci, Van Ryzin and 
Jackson 2018).  Second, it is possible that contagion effects 
exist whereby the presence of minority bureaucrats changes 
the behavior of majority bureaucrats or gives them access 
to a better understanding of client needs; a US study of teen 
pregnancy in Georgia is relevant here as it documents how 
white male teachers interact with their African American 
female colleagues to address the problem (Atkins and Wilkins 
2013).  
These instrumental aspects of representative bureaucracy, 
either active or symbolic, not only challenge the empirical 
and normative contentions of those opposed to representative 
bureaucracy, but also link into the growing literature that finds 
representative bureaucracies are more effective (see among 
others Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Hong 2016a; 2016b; 
Roch, Pitts and Navarro 2010; Andrews, Ashworth and Meier 
2014; Schuck and Hemp 2016).  Additional research is needed 
on when and under what conditions representation contributes 
to the effectiveness of public organizations. 
Symbolic Representation
Symbolic representation might be considered the free lunch 
of representative bureaucracy; by simply being passively 
representative of the population, the bureaucracy gains the 
cooperation of citizens and is able to implement more effective 
public policy.  No changes are required by the bureaucracy in 
theory; the causal path is solely via the actions of the client.  
Although the notion of symbolic representation has long 
appeared in the literature (see Mosher 1968) and much of 
the empirical literature noted it before investigating active 
representation (Meier and Nigro 1976), the empirical literature 
expressly looking for symbolic representation has its origins in 
the theoretical work of Keiser et al. (2002; but see Thieleman 
and Stewart 1996).  Meier and Nicholson-Crotty’s (2006) study 
of sexual assault used the extensive under reporting of sexual 
assaults to argue that an increase in women on the police force 
sent a signal to women that reports of sexual assault would 
be taken more seriously and this would, in turn, encourage 
more women to report these assaults.  Finding empirical 
correlations consistent with this hypothesis, they concluded 
that symbolic representation was likely the explanation. They 
also found an increase in the number of arrests but that might 
have resulted from active representation rather than just the 
symbolic representation.  Much subsequent empirical work 
also conceded that finding a positive correlation between 
passive representation and outcomes that benefit the clients 
who are passively represented might mean either active 
representation occurred or that symbolic representation might 
have be the reason.  In short, such studies could not determine 
if the bureaucrat did something different or if the client acted 
in a different way (Lim 2006).  This was often a conclusion 
of the literature from education where it was not possible to 
distinguish between active teacher representation and the 
student adopting a role model and changing behavior (Dee 
2004). 
The effort to disentangle symbolic and active representation 
was pushed forward by experimental work by Riccucci and 
colleagues (Riccucci, Van Ryzin and Li 2016; Riccucci, Van 
Ryzin and Jackson 2918) focusing primarily on race and 
police.  Riccucci et al. (2018) found that African American 
respondents rated police forces with more African Americans 
more positively controlling for the level of performance of 
the police in regard to racial complaints. Such findings were 
consistent with observational findings that indicated African 
American motorists were more likely to rate the behavior of an 
African American officer as fair even when the contact resulted 
in a negative outcome for the motorist (Epp, Maynard-Moody 
and Haider-Markel 2014). Symbolic representation, as a result, 
holds out the promise that bureaucracies will be more effective 
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or perceived as more effective without actually changing 
anything that bureaucrats do.   
Probing the microtheory behind symbolic representation, 
however, suggests that there are clear limits to it.  Examining 
the symbolic representation process from a behavioral 
perspective would be valuable.  Why might a client change 
behavior simply because the visible identity of the bureaucrat 
matches that of the citizen? The logic is that the client sees a 
bureaucrat who looks like herself and assumes that they share 
common experiences.  As a result, the client thinks that the 
bureaucrat is more likely to respond to the problems that the 
client faces and treat the client fairly.  Why might they have 
these expectations?  These are expectations that come from 
lived experiences; experiences with either bureaucrats or 
nonbureaucrats and often colored by experiences with racism 
or sexism or other forms of discrimination.  All of these 
experiences contribute to a Bayesian prior in regard to how the 
client expects to be treated.  
The symbolic logic, however, is based on the notion that you 
have no actual prior experience with either the individual 
bureaucrat or the bureaucratic agency represented by the 
bureaucrat. Any prior experience is likely to adjust this 
Bayesian prior in the direction of that experience.  If African 
American parents have found that African American teachers 
are more interested in their child or have been more effective 
in teaching their child, they are likely to increase their 
expectation that an African American teacher will benefit their 
child and respond with greater parental coproduction (Vinopal 
2017).  Just as positive experiences adjust the expectation 
upward, negative expectations adjust the expectation 
downward.   
Bureaucratic interactions in this logic might be considered 
the equivalent of a repeat game with each interaction resulting 
in an adjustment of priors.  The client then adjusts his or her 
behavior (level of trust, perception of legitimacy) accordingly.  
This logic suggests clear limits to symbolic representation.  If 
an African American man is consistently treated poorly by 
African American police officers or sees that behavior affect 
others like himself, he is likely to see the police officer as blue 
(or even white) not black.  Wright’s (2018) analysis of the 
Washington DC police, as an example, reveals substantial 
public skepticism among African Americans of the DC 
police even though nearly 60% of police officers are African 
American.  Rosenbaum et al. (2005) finds that attitudes toward 
the police are affected by both prior encounters and encounters 
between the police and others that the citizen knows about.  
As one moves to the extremes in this behavior, the limits are 
clearly obvious from the historical examples of Vichy France 
or Quisling Norway.  The use of Irish troops to suppress Irish 
revolts against the United Kingdom generated little symbolic 
representation benefits and likely further inflamed tensions 
(see also van Gool 2008 on caste in India).
Symbolic representation, therefore, has limits.  It cannot be a 
permanent solution to tension between bureaucrats and clients 
if there is no commitment to change bureaucratic behavior. 
Any organization seeking symbolic representation will also 
need to accommodate pressures for active representation. 
Conclusion
In sum, I see four major issues related to bureaucracy and 
democracy that provide an agenda for future research.  First, 
the symbiotic relationship between electoral institutions and 
bureaucracy is threatened by the failure of electoral institutions 
to resolve conflict and contribute effective public policy.  This 
political failure affects both the linkage between the public and 
elected officials and the relationship between elected officials 
and government bureaucrats.  The upshot of this failure is 
that public administrators must perform both the traditional 
administrative functions and also engage in the political 
process.  As a result, the job of the public administrator 
has become more difficult and policy failures will be more 
frequent. As an aside, I should note that it complicates the 

Politics, Bureaucracy and Successful Governance
teaching of public administration also because in general 
our curricula do not cover how to manage the political 
process. Because the failure of politics weakens the process of 
overhead democracy in providing guidance for bureaucracy, 
bureaucracies must also expand their activities that can 
represent the interests of the public directly.
Second, for the bureaucracy to represent, it needs information 
on the policy preferences of the general public and one 
method of ascertaining these preferences is through citizen 
evaluations of public services.  Research is needed on the most 
effective way to communicate the performance information 
of government programs to avoid problems or perceptual 
bias and allow the public to make rational choices about the 
services they would like to receive. Designing performance 
criteria that match those of the citizens is also important. 
Third, bureaucracies need to expand their representational 
roles to contribute more to bottom up democracy in the 
policy process.  For this to occur, public bureaucracies 
need to understand that bureaucratic representation does 
not necessarily create biases or generate results that the 
organization would like to avoid.  Many aspects of bureaucratic 
representation are functional for an organization and can lead 
to better overall performance and more citizen satisfaction. 
Understanding the instrumental aspects of representative 
bureaucracy is important. 
Fourth, symbolic representation appears to benefit government 
organizations by enhancing legitimacy and creating trust and 
willingness to coproduce.  I have argued today that symbolic 
representation without changes in actual policy outputs is 
unlikely to produce any of the benefits that organizations 
seek.  Symbolic representation might be viewed as an implicit 
contract that some form of active representation is likely. 
These four questions are my starting point for my 
professorship on bureaucracy and democracy.  I am confident 
that the list will expand over the next several years at Leiden 
University and that new issues will arise that merit study.
Finally, I would like to thank the Executive Board of Leiden 
University for appointing me to the chair for Bureaucracy and 
Democracy at the Institute of Public Administration. I would 
like to thank the faculty of the Institute for making my past 
visits stimulating and engaging and would especially like to 
thank Sandra Groeneveld for her leadership in facilitating my 
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